INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment protects our rights to speak and to refrain from speaking.
These rights exist because "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas…the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 1 Over time, the Supreme Court has extended these rights even to speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." 2 Nevertheless, it is recognized that some regulation of commercial speech must be permissible. 3 Impositions on speech of this nature are justified on the basis that:
The truth of commercial speech…may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. 4 In few arenas is the imbalance of information between producer and consumer more prevalent than that of food production. Indeed, many food producers lobby to prevent consumers from discovering anything about their products. 5 Thus, there is a tension between consumers-most of whom want to know what they are eating, where it 1 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 2 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) . 3 Id. at 770. 4 Id. at 772. 5 See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, States Look to Ban Efforts to Reveal Farm Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/us/14video.html?_r=2&ref=us (discussing proposed laws that would criminalize production, distribution, or possession of photos or videos taken at agricultural facilities without permission).
came from, and how it was produced-and food manufacturers-most of whom do whatever they can not to disclose this information. Under current First Amendment doctrine, just what do food companies have the right not to tell their customers?
This question came into sharp focus in the aftermath of the 1993 U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decision to approve the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), 6 a genetically modified growth hormone, in dairy cows. 7 The hormone has been observed to increase milk production by approximately 10%, 8 and Monsanto, the manufacturer of the commercial variety of the drug (Posilac), touts the possibility of vastly increased profits for dairies that use it. 9 Since the time it was being considered for commercial use, many scientists and consumer groups have voiced concerns over the possible negative effects of the drug on human, animal, and public health. One issue is that rBST use increases the level of insulin-like growth factor-1 (IGF-1) in the milk and ultimately in the blood of the consumer. 10 Elevated levels of IGF-1 have been repeatedly linked to an increased risk of breast, prostate, and colon cancer. 11 Another problem is that rBST increases the incidence of mastitis-udder infections-in dairy herds by about 25%, requiring substantial use of antibiotics. 12 Many studies have warned against the overuse of antibiotics in agriculture and its negative 6 This drug is also known as "recombinant bovine growth hormone," or rBGH. 7 T. Adler, Debating BST 'til the Cows Come Home, 149 SCIENCE NEWS 52, 52 (1996) . 8 Apr. 6, 2011 , available at http://www.boiseweekly.com/gyrobase/got-milk-got-drugs-got-both-state-responds-after-idaho-dairycattle-test-positive-in-federal-good-safety-tests/Content?oid=2174048&showFullText=true.
impact on public health-these studies have found specifically that antibiotic-resistant food-borne infections such as salmonella are caused primarily by overuse of antibiotics in agriculture. 13 Worse, the FDA admits that antibiotic residues may be found in the milk from treated cows. 14 Mastitis infections also lead to higher amounts of somatic cellspus-in the milk, which is not only unappetizing but also causes milk to sour more quickly. 15 Severe mastitis problems can be contained only by culling the affected members of a dairy herd. FDA warns that use of the hormone causes lameness in cows. 16 Finally, rBST causes cows unnaturally to produce milk in their "negative energy phase"-the period after calving, during which a cow's energy intake is less than its energy outputcausing the milk to be lower in protein. 17 These concerns have led most of the industrialized nations of the world, including all 25 members of the European Union, to ban the artificial hormone. 18 Despite these problems, however, the FDA approved its use "in one of the most oftcriticized decisions in its history because agency employees with former ties to Monsanto were involved." 19 A Government Accountability Office inquiry cleared those involved of any conflict-of-interest violations, despite the fact that a former Monsanto researcher "was 13 purchasing decisions based on that information was an insufficient justification for curtailing the producers' right not to speak. 26 Not only do dairy producers not have to disclose their use of the synthetic hormone, but since 1994, any dairy producer that wants to make an "rBST-free" claim on its milk must also include an FDA-imposed disclaimer stating "No significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST treated cows," 27 a disclaimer that was also written by Monsanto VP-to-be Michael Taylor. 28 Monsanto, however, is still not satisfied, claiming that any mention of rBST is misleading to consumers because it implies there is something wrong with rBST use. 29 The corporation has continued to lobby to have the Guidance changed to completely disallow any rBST claims on labels. 30 A similar story has played out with the use of genetically engineered (GE) crops and, like fish, and adding a growth hormone from a Chinook salmon. 32 The result is a fish that grows twice as fast as natural Atlantic salmon because it does not stop growing in the colder months when natural salmon conserve their energy. 33 Already, consumers have criticized the FDA for its lack of transparency throughout the approval process and have expressed concerns over whether the salmon will be identified as GE when finally offered for purchase. 34 The FDA has responded by stating that "food from AquAdvantage Salmon…is as safe to eat as food from other Atlantic salmon" and that they "have found no biologically relevant difference between food from [AquaBounty salmon] and conventional Atlantic salmon." 35 Consumer groups are concerned that AquAdvantage® salmon may be sold to the public with no labeling that distinguishes it from natural salmon. This concern is well justified by the FDA's record with regard to GE food labeling. Not only does the FDA not require labeling of GE foods, 36 it currently discourages food producers from advertising that their products do not contain genetically engineered ingredients by disseminating Guidances that suggest "no GMO," "GMO-free" and like claims may be actionable under the misbranding statute of the FDCA. 37 They are misleading, the FDA maintains, because they imply that genetic modification is bad and because a consumer might assume, from a "GMO-free" label, that foods without that label actually contain other genetically modified 32 37 Id. The FDA suggests using language such as "We do not use ingredients that were produced using biotechnology"-as long as it is not implied anywhere on the label that non-GE foods are better in any way than GE. organisms, rather than being genetically modified themselves. 38 Due in part to such Guidance, consumers today encounter GE organisms in more than 75% of processed foods, 41 and most are unaware of this fact: fewer than half of the consumers interviewed in a Rutgers survey were aware that GE foods are sold in supermarkets at all. 42 The most common GE crops are corn, soy, cottonseed, canola, sugar beets, and alfalfa-today, 86% of corn, 93% of cotton, and 93% of soy sold in the United States is genetically engineered. 43 Many of these popular GE organisms are patented by Monsanto, 44 whose influence within the FDA was described above. Some local governments, stymied by federal rules against "no GMO" labeling, have attempted to ban GE foods altogether. 45 In response, the biotech lobby has rushed to pass laws restricting regulation of plants to the more industry- friendly state governments and removing GE crops from local governments' regulatory authority. 46 The FDA presumes that new GE plants are "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS)-meaning they are not subject to the petition and approval process required of new food additives; instead, GE foods are subject only to post-market surveillance like food. 47 This GRAS rule was drafted by former Monsanto lawyer, later Monsanto VP Michael Taylor, who also approved rBST while he was at the FDA. 48 Today, genetic engineering is one of several band-aids used to solve problems in our food production system. For example, due to the costs and serious environmental harms of storing and disposing of the waste from the millions of animals raised each year in confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), 49 scientists in Canada have developed a pig with altered genes from mice and the E. coli bacterium that produces more environmentally friendly manure. 50 CAFOs also breed disease, and the problem is so bad that roughly 97% of hogs in CAFOs receive continuous antibiotics in their food and water. 51 In response to mad cow disease scares, scientists created a mad-cow-resistant cow by removing a protein from its DNA. 52 However, mad cow disease is usually spread through the common industry practice of using cattle parts in cattle feed. 53 A quicker and more appropriate fix than a costly disease-resistant cow, it seems, would be to ban the cannibalistic feeding practice, 46 In light of these grisly facts, it is no surprise that food manufacturers are interested in halting the flow of information. The public points again and again at its "right to know," and consumers' overwhelming desire to have rBST and other GE products labeled has been documented in numerous studies and surveys. 56 There is an undeniable imbalance of information between consumers and food producers, and there is little that pervades our lives so much as the foods we put into our bodies every day. For these reasons, state legislatures have continually attempted to bridge the information gap with reasonable impositions on food producers' commercial speech. Such impositions could be analyzed either under the Central Hudson "substantial governmental interest" framework or under the less stringent "rational basis" standard set forth in Zauderer. This paper examines both tests and how they have been applied in the context of food labeling and concludes that, although consumers' right to know how their food is produced could satisfy either 54 majority characterized the asserted interest as nothing more than "consumer curiosity,"
because the state had not, itself, explicitly adopted the concerns of its consumers. 69 In deciding this was insufficient, the Amestoy court relied on the fact that the FDA had determined there was no significant difference in milk from cows treated with rBST and from those not treated. 70 The court overlooked not only substantial research supporting the opposite conclusion but also a number of reasons other than food safety that consumers use to make purchasing decisions and that therefore underlie any desire to know how food is produced.
Judge Leval, dissenting, pointed out many of these reasons that appeared in the legislative history of the statute, including "human health, cow health, biotechnology, and the survival of small dairy farms." 71 He argued that this was far from mere "curiosity" and that the court's reliance on the FDA's findings regarding safety was misplaced: "To suggest that a government agency's failure to find a health risk in a short-term study of a new genetic technology should bar a state from requiring simple disclosure of the use of that technology where its citizens are concerned about such health risks would be unreasonable and dangerous." 72 The majority's view of the asserted interest as "consumer curiosity," and its subsequent determination that this interest was not substantial, however, obviously carried the day. 69 Id. at 73-74. 70 Id. 71 Id. at 76. 72 Id. at 77.
Consumers' Right to Know as a Substantial Interest
The FDA has primary authority over food advertising and labeling. In assessing the adequacy and appropriateness of labeling, the agency looks to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which dictates that a food is misbranded if the label is "false or misleading in any particular. irradiation-used to destroy insects and microorganisms-could cause changes in organoleptic properties of the finished food and that, without special labeling, consumers might assume that such foods were unprocessed. 76 Thus, the agency considered the information "material" for purposes of the Act.
During hearings on GE foods, "Many consumers commented that they had a right or desire to know that a food had been derived from a plant developed by 'genetic engineering.'" 77 In doing so, they relied on the definition of materiality in section 201(n) and the FDA's comments on materiality in reference to irradiation. However, the FDA, again with the help of Michael Taylor, 78 declined to find materiality with respect to genetic engineering and thus refused to require disclosure of GE ingredients on labels. 79 That decision was based on the FDA's assessment that there is no meaningful difference between GE and non-GE foods. 80 However, plenty of food regulations have nothing to do with "significant" differences in foods produced in various ways and could only be based on consumers' desire to have information that is important to them. For instance, until 1997, the FDA directed that the term "kosher" "be used only on food products that meet certain religious dietary requirements." 81 It also found that the phrase "kosher style" was likely to "cause the prospective purchaser to think that the product is 'kosher'" and thus discouraged use of the phrase. 82 It is relevant that the FDA repealed the rule because misuse of "kosher" and "kosher style" was adequately covered by the general "misbranding" statute of the FDCA, because this necessarily implies that the FDA considers kosher to be a material fact. This materiality can come only from consumer preference-indeed, it would be impossible to devise a test to distinguish between foods prepared by Jews and those prepared by Gentiles. The "organic" label is another food regulation that caters to consumers' desire to know about their food rather than to any safety concerns due to significant differences in end products. have deemed "substantial" over the years. For instance, Congress's assessment that use of the word "Olympic" by athletic associations other than the U.S. Olympic Committee was given credence by the Court, because the government had a substantial interest in "ensur[ing] that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to produce a 'quality product,' that, in turn, benefits the public" and in "promoting, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of amateur athletes from the United States in 'the great four-yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games.'" 87 The Court has also found that a government's interest in preventing unsubstantiated harmful effects "on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime" was substantial enough to prohibit the advertising of casino gambling to Puerto Rico residents (because "the legislators wanted the tourists to flock to the casinos to gamble, but not [their] own people")-despite the fact that casino gambling was perfectly legal. 88 The Court has even found "[preserving] the quality of urban life" to be an interest substantial enough to support a ban on adult theaters within 1,000 feet of any residential area, home, church, park, or school, in spite of a lack of any studies regarding the effect of adult theaters on urban life in that area. 89 A consumer's right to know, especially when based on the weighty concerns described above, is at least as substantial as any of these. U.S. 94 The statute at issue in that case was the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which required debt relief agencies-professionals providing bankruptcy services to individual consumers-to identify themselves as debt relief agencies and disclose that their services may entail bankruptcy relief in their advertisements. 95 The statute was aimed at preventing consumers seeking debt relief from being caught by surprise when the "debt relief" offered-bankruptcy services-turned out to cost money. 96 The plaintiffs contended that the disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights. 97 They pressed for a Central Hudson analysis, but the court held that the rational basis standard of Zauderer applied, because the disclosures were "intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements, and they entail only an accurate statement of the advertiser's legal status and the character of the assistance provided. Moreover, they do not prevent debt relief agencies from conveying any additional information through their advertisements." 98 The was challenging an Ohio statute that restricted dairies' rights to advertise non-use of rBST in two different ways. First, the statute at issue, essentially tracking FDA Guidance on the issue, would allow disclosure of non-use, but not statements like "rBST-free," because they might mislead consumers as to what's in their milk. 105 The FDA had determined that such claims are misleading both because consumers might assume that unlabeled milk actually contains the growth hormone, rather than just having been produced from cows injected with it, and because consumers might assume that milk from rBST-treated cows is inferior, when the FDA had found no significant difference. 106 Second, all claims had to be accompanied by the statement "FDA has determined that no significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and non-rbST-supplemented cows."
The disclaimer had to appear "on the same label panel, "in exactly the same font, style, case, and color and at least half the size (but no smaller than seven point font)," and it had to be contiguous with the rBST non-use notice. 107 With regard to the first restriction-disallowing claims such as "rBST-free"-the court applied the Central Hudson test, because this part of the statute attempted to ban certain speech. 108 The court concluded, first, that the banned speech was not inherently misleading and was thus entitled to First Amendment protection. In making this finding, the court explicitly recognized several compositional differences between rBST and nonrBST milk that justify a differentiation. Higher levels of IGF-1 and somatic cells and lower nutritional quality of the milk were all held up as significant differences, meaning that it was not misleading to imply that non-rBST milk is better. 109 Additionally, the fact that available technology did not allow the FDA to differentiate between naturally occurring BST and rBST in the milk was not conclusive evidence that there was, in fact, no rBST present in milk from treated cows. 110 The state even conceded that milk from treated cows "could" contain rBST. 111 For this reason, and because it was conclusively true that milk from untreated cows definitely could not contain rBST, the court found that an "rBST-free" claim was not misleading. 112 Moving through the Central Hudson factors, the court found that Ohio's asserted interest in preventing consumer deception-although conceded to be substantial-was invalid, because Ohio and the FDA, whose Guidance the statute was based on, had found only that the prohibited labels "may" be misleading. 113 The court placed the burden on
Ohio to show that the harm it aimed to prevent would actually occur absent the speech restriction and characterized the record of consumer deception as "weak at best." 114 The court did not rely heavily on this prong of the test, however, because it also found the speech prohibition was not narrowly tailored; instead of banning the "rBST-free" label, Ohio could have required the additional statement that "rSBT has yet to be detected in conventional milk." 115 The restriction thus failed Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny. 116 In examining the second speech restriction-the compulsory "no significant difference" disclaimer-the court applied the Zauderer standard despite IDFA's push for a Importantly, the court noted that "First Amendment protection for commercial speech is justified in large part by the information's value to consumers" and that the speech rights of advertisers are less valuable than consumers'; specifically, businesses' "constitutionally protected interest in not providing the required factual information is 'minimal.'" 120 Again,
Ohio argued that it was following FDA Guidance when it decided to require a "no significant difference" disclaimer-the FDA had issued the Guidance because, it said, rBST-free claims might mislead consumers into thinking there's something wrong with milk produced using rBST. 121 This possibility of deception was found to be better than "speculative," and therefore sufficient under the Zauderer standard. The court then determined that the disclaimer was reasonably related to preventing the possible consumer deception. 122 Thus, the court upheld the disclaimer as permissible mandatory speech under the rational basis test.
As for the requirement that the disclaimer appear contiguous to the "rBST-free" claim, however, the court found the rational basis test was not satisfied. The IDFA wanted to link the disclaimer to their "rBST-free" language with an asterisk, but this was specifically disallowed under the statute. 123 Boggs testified that he had "been aware of [asterisks being a problem in conveying information] for a long time" and that the contiguity requirement was based on "anecdotal evidence" from talking to grocery store patrons, who made statements such as: "oftentimes it's hard to understand labels, especially when the print is so small." 124 Because this concern did not reflect the inefficacy of joining the FDA disclaimer with an asterisk, the court found, the contiguity requirement had "no demonstrable connection to ensuring that consumers are not misled" and it thus failed the rational basis test. 125 Although the Boggs case does not speak specifically to whether a state may mandate disclosure of rBST use, it does address related issues, and, in the process, it establishes baselines for what does and does not pass muster under the Zauderer standard.
Consumers' Right to Know Under the Rational Basis Test
A disclosure of rBST use or some other fact about the manner in which a food was produced is accurate and not controversial and clearly aimed at preventing consumer deception. Mandatory labeling, then, clearly falls within the Zauderer framework. The question remains whether mandatory disclosures can survive rational basis scrutiny when the basis being scrutinized is the right of consumers to know about their food.
Consumers have myriad reasons to choose from as a foundation for their desire to know how their food is produced. With regard to rBST, the most prevalent are those credited by Judge Leval in his Amestoy dissent: human and cow health and concerns about small businesses and biotechnology generally. Environmental concerns also exist-rBST treatment requires the use and disposal of pre-filled syringes as medical waste. 126 Concerns about biotechnology may, in turn, be based on a host of other factors.
Proponents of genetic engineering have long argued that GE crops are an indispensable tool for feeding a hungry and rapidly growing human population. 127 However, GE crops are costly to develop, and those costs are passed on to farmers. Poor farmers in hungerstricken areas simply cannot afford to buy seeds. 128 In any case, we already produce enough food to feed everyone on the planet; the problem is not in the production but in the distribution. 129 Additionally, the lack of biodiversity that results from widespread use of identical crops may increase the risk of famine, as the crops will all be vulnerable to the same unforeseen diseases, pests, or climate conditions. 130 GE crops may also have unintended effects on the balance of ecosystems, because, although safe for human consumption, some GE crops are deadly to other organisms. 131 These biodiversity concerns are exacerbated by the common phenomenon of transgenic pollution-crosspollination of non-GE crops with pollen from nearby GE farms. Transgenic pollution can cause devastating financial losses by destroying the value of organic crops (organic labeling precludes the presence of more than 5% genetically modified organisms 132 ) and may open innocent farmers up to infringement suits by seed patent owners. 133 A GE concern recognized even by the FDA is that of allergenicity. When genetic material is taken from a plant that is commonly allergenic, such as a peanut, there is a danger that the resulting GE plant may share the allergenic traits. Thus, the presence of any known allergens in GE foods must be disclosed on the label of those foods. 134 New information about rBST and GE foods is constantly being uncovered. Sorrell court went on to say that, because of "the state's inability to identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we did not reach the proper relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and its ends" in Amestoy. 136 The problem is that the Amestoy court never considered whether Vermont had asserted a legitimate state interest-the standard for rational basis review-because it applied the Central Hudson test, which requires a substantial interest. And Sorrell purports to say that, where the asserted interest in a mandatory disclosure is only "gratification of consumer curiosity," which the court language. Based on the results of rBST and other GE foods awareness surveys, it would not be difficult to show that, without rBST labels, consumers assume their milk does not contain it or are unaware that it even exists. 137 Furthermore, disclosure of rBST use does not even rise to the level of the NCEN disclosure, which appears far more likely to lead consumers to believe eggs are bad than a mere statement of fact about productionespecially considering the inclusion of the "no significant difference" disclaimer. A mandatory label would address this possibility for deception and would thus survive rational basis scrutiny.
A second problem with the Amestoy decision is that, had the court properly characterized the asserted state interest as a consumer's right to know (based on various health, animal welfare, business and other concerns), the statute would have survived even the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson. In other words, the court never issued a ruling on a "consumer's right to know" as a substantial interest, because it improperly equated it with mere "consumer curiosity" without examining any of the reasons milk purchasers are interested in how their milk is produced. Even the FDA has characterized a consumer's right to know as a substantial interest, stating that whether information is "material" or not under the FDCA depends in part on whether consumers view the information as important. It remains to be seen whether courts will follow the lead of Boggs or Amestoy in the inevitable future cases regarding mandatory food labeling. Given the explosion in food technology in recent years, the path we choose will have a dramatic impact on how much truth we get when it comes to our food. A consumer's right to know is the same as his right to decide what to purchase and what to eat based on whatever criteria he deems important-not just whether it is poisonous or not. We do not endeavor to keep vegetarians and vegans from discovering whether there are animal products in food, because we recognize that vegetarianism and veganism are legitimate food choices based on something other than safety-which, for animal products, has been demonstrated through thousands of generations of omnivorous humans. The biotech industrial farming lobby's position that information about food "only confuses the consumer" 139 cuts against the values expressed in the First Amendment-the free flow of information, a rich marketplace of ideas, and the pursuit of truth. If the worth of an idea is to be measured by its acceptance in that free marketplace, let the information about industrial farming practices flow freely, and let us see how worthwhile these practices are.
